DENG-ERA AGRICULTURE IN CHINA
Using all available land in Nanjing
In 1979, three years after Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping began dismantling the "rigidly" controlled agriculture collectives and encouraging farmers to raise crops in individual plots. According to rules that varied from province to province, farmers were allowed to hire a certain numbers of laborers, and sell their surplus. Peasants were not allowed to own land but they were given long term leases and rights to renew the leases so their was an incentive for them to take care of the land. Land rights — except in terms of buying, selling and titled ownership — was given to agriculture labor organization to individual families. In effect the pre-revolutionary system was restored with state holding claim to part of the crop instead of the landlord.
In the 1980s, families in areas affected by the reforms were given a little over half an acre to tend. Those that possessed good fertile land were able to make a healthy profits growing rice, vegetables, sugar and other products. Those that wanted more joined together with other farmers and improved irrigation and roads and became more productive an made even more money. Deng also introduced incentive price bonuses for above-quota grain production and launched a "responsibility system" which allowed farmers to sell surplus crops on the open market after the met their government quotas. In 1984, in an effort to increase production, the quota was dropped completely in 1984 for all crops expect cotton and grain.
Even though many farmers used hoes instead of tractors, crop yields jumped dramatically. Wheat production doubled between 1978 and 1985 from 41 million to 87 million tons. By 1987 the output of grains and tubers was three times that of India and almost equal to that of the U.S. and Soviet Union. Agriculture has been neglected in the later stages of the economic reforms. By the 1990s the benefits received by farmers began to level off and the real farm incomes decreased as the costs of fertilizer, hybrid seeds and other necessities rose faster than crop prices.
Good Websites and Sources on Deng Xiaoping: Wikipedia article Wikipedia ; CNN Profile cnn.com ; New York Times Obituary; China Daily Profile chinadaily.com. ; Wikipedia article on Economic Reforms in China Wikipedia ; Wikipedia article on Special Economic Zones Wikipedia ; History Websites: 1) Chaos Group of University of Maryland chaos.umd.edu/history/toc ; 2) WWW VL: History China vlib.iue.it/history/asia ; 3) Wikipedia article on the History of China Wikipedia 4) China Knowledge; 5) Gutenberg.org e-book gutenberg.org/files ; Links in this Website: Main China Page factsanddetails.com/china (Click History)
Books About Deng Xiaoping: "Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China" by Ezra F. Vogel (Belknap/Harvard University, 2011); "Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping" by Richard Baum (1996, Princeton University Press); "China After Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing Since Tiananmen" by Willy Wo-lap Lam (1995, P.A. Professional Consultants); "Deng Xiaoping" by Uli Franz (1988, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich); "Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography" by David S.G. Goodman (1994, Routledge); "Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire" by Ruan Ming (1994, Westview Press); "Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China" by Richard Evans 1993, Hamish Hamilton); "Deng Xiaoping: My Father" by Deng Maomao (1995, Basic Books); "Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman" edited by David Shambaugh (1995, Clarendon Paperbacks); "The New Emperors: Mao and Deng — a Dual Biography" by Harrison E. Salisbury (1992, HarperCollins). Books about Modern China: "The Penguin History of Modern China" by Jonathan Fenby. "Cambridge History of China" multiple volumes (Cambridge University Press); "In Search of Modern China" by Jonathan D. Spence; “China in the 21st Century” by Jeffrey Wasserstrom; “The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China” edited by Jeffrey Wasserstrom covers the period from 1550 to the present day. "China-Alive in a Bitter Sea" by Fox Butterfield,; "To Get Rich is Glorious by Orville Schell; "Coming Alive-China After Mao" by Roger Garside; The Dragon Wakes" by Christopher Hibbert.
Deng's Economic Reforms in the Countryside
The post-Mao Communist Party government under Deng Xiaoping began its program of economic reform in the countryside, where peasants were encouraged to participate in the market economy. Communes and collectives were dismantled and were divided up into plots of land that was leased back to peasants who were encouraged to raise crops to sell in private markets.
Farmland in Sichuan
The reforms began with the "household contract" and "responsibility system," developed and launched quietly in 1978 by an 18-year-old villager, Yan Hongchang, who started a production group with the leaders of 20 villages. In the little-known village of Xiaogang in east Anhui Province 18 farmers signed a secret agreement to divide communally owned farmland into individual sections called “household contracts”. At the time, this should have been regarded as a hefty “counter-revolutionary crime”. But the experiment won the support of Deng and was quickly implemented across the nation, becoming the first major breakthrough in economic reform and opening up. In the late 1970s, Chinese farmers and rural cadres were frustrated with the commune system, seeing it as an obstacle to improving agricultural production and their lives. Thus, Xiaogang village's privatization experiment quickly won popular support and was opposed only by a few diehard Maoist ideologues and conservatives.
Later the "responsibility system" became common place all over China and incentive price bonuses for above-quota grain production were introduced. Many have said that Deng set up a system that allowed the Chinese do what they do best — make money. The system relied on Township and Village enterprises (TVEs), which produced a class of wealthy and corrupt autocrats.
The early economic reforms meant that people could make money selling produce at local markets and doing work at home, such as mending clothes, repairing pots, or giving piano lessons, and opening up small businesses. One official told Theroux in 1988, "China is the first stage of socialism — we are just beginning to develop. In some ways, we are underdeveloped and we are proceeding slowly and carefully. In the countryside the reforms have gone smoothly. But in the cities much remains to be done."
See Deng Reforms and the Poor, Poor, Life
Deng Xiaoping’s Agricultural Reforms (1980)
According to Columbia University’s Asia for Educators: “ Under Mao Zedong (1893-1976), family farming had been eliminated as farmers, their land, animals, and equipment were first organized into agricultural cooperatives and then into vast people’s communes in which agricultural work was completely collectivized. Deng’s policy was to allow the communes to assign land to individual farming families on a contract basis. The family, now the basic unit of production, was under contract to sell the state a certain amount of grain at a fixed price. They could sell the surplus on the market at market prices. These reforms, combined with good weather, resulted in sharp increases in production and significant increases in average family income and standards of living in the early to mid-1980s. [Source: Asia for Educators, Columbia University, Primary Sources with DBQs, afe.easia.columbia.edu ]
By the end of 1984, approximately 98 percent of the old production teams had adopted the contract responsibility system, and all but 249 communes had been dissolved, their governmental functions passed on to 91,000 township and town governments. Production team organizations were replaced by 940,000 village committees. Under the responsibility system, farm families no longer devoted most of their efforts to collective production but instead generally signed contracts with the village or town to cultivate a given crop on a particular piece of land. After harvest a certain amount of the crop had to be sold to the unit at a predetermined price, and any output beyond that amount was the property of the family, either to be sold in the market or to be consumed. Beyond the amount contracted for delivery to the collective, farmers were allowed to determine for themselves what and how to produce. [Source: Library of Congress *]
Daily life in much of China Market activity played a central role in the rural economy of the 1980s. Farmers sold a growing share of their produce in rural or urban free markets and purchased many of the inputs that had formerly been supplied by the team or brigade. A prominent new institution that thrived in the market environment was the "specialized household." Specialized households operated in the classic pattern of the entrepreneur, buying or renting equipment to produce a good or service that was in short supply locally. Some of the most common specialties were trucking, chicken raising, pig raising, and technical agricultural services, such as irrigation and pest control. Many of the specialized households became quite wealthy relative to the average farmer. *
The new economic climate and the relaxation of restrictions on the movements of rural residents gave rise to numerous opportunities for profit-making ventures in the countryside. Towns, villages, and groups of households referred to as "rural economic unions" established small factories, processing operations, construction teams, catering services, and other kinds of nonagricultural concerns. Many of these organizations had links with urban enterprises that found the services of these rural units to be less expensive and more efficient than those of their formal urban counterparts. *
The growth of these nonagricultural enterprises in the countryside created a large number of new jobs, making it possible for many workers who were no longer needed in agriculture to "leave the land but stay in the country," significantly changing the structure of the rural economy and increasing rural incomes. In 1986 nonagricultural enterprises in the countryside employed 21 percent of the rural labor force and for the first time produced over half the value of rural output. *
Document Explaining Deng Xiaoping’s Agricultural Reforms (1980)
In the following document dated November 7, 1980— “From the Office of the CCP Dehong Dai Nationality and Qingbo Autonomous Zhou Committee: “Several Questions in Strengthening and Perfecting the Job Responsibility Systems of Agricultural Production” — a local Communist Party office supplies answers to questions about the new Deng agricultural system in a document: “From the Office of the CCP Dehong Dai Nationality and Qingbo Autonomous Zhou Committee: “Several Questions in Strengthening and Perfecting the Job Responsibility Systems of Agricultural Production” (1980) Owing to the shortcomings in the movement of collectivization, the ultra.left interruptions, and the fact that for a long period of time the Party had not shifted the emphasis of work to economic construction, the current material and technical bases for the collective economy are still comparatively weak. Meanwhile, there also are matters in need of improvement and perfection concerning systems and structure of the people’s communes, the weakest link being the management and administrative work. [Source: “Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century”, compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 494-496 ]
“For a long time there have been no significant improvements and breakthroughs in implementing the principle of distribution according to work and in perfecting the system of job responsibility for production. This has caused suppression of the peasants’ socialist initiative as well as insufficient exertion of the superiority of collectivization. Because the collective economy has not been doing satisfactorily people in a few backward and poverty.stricken localities have even less faith in agricultural collectivization. We must face these problems squarely and solve them aggressively and step by step. At present, it is necessary to regard improvement of management and administration implementation of distribution according to work, and improvement and perfection of the system of job responsibility for production as the central link for further consolidation of the collective economy and for development of agricultural production. It is necessary to put in a lot of strenuous effort to grasp it tight and grasp it well.
“3. Under the moral encouragement of the Third Plenary Session, Party cadres and the masses of commune members have in the recent two years proceeded from actual conditions, liberated their thought and boldly explored, and established many forms of job responsibility systems for production, which can be generally divided into two categories: one is contracted work of small segments with payments according to fixed quotas, and the other is contracted work and production quotas with payments in accordance with actual production.
“Results of implementation indicate that most areas have increased production by acquiring some new experience. Especially noteworthy is the emergence of the system of job responsibility that gives contracts to specialized persons and gives payment in accordance with actual production, which is widely welcomed by commune members. This is a very good start.
Deng-era farmer's market
“Leadership at various levels should sum up the positive and negative experiences, together with the broad masses, and help the communes and brigades perfect and improve the system of job responsibility to energetically push further the management work of the collective economy.
“5. The system of job responsibility, of giving contracts to specific persons and giving payments in accordance with actual production, is a system based on division of labor and cooperative work. Under the system, the labor forces [peasants] who are good in agriculture receive contracts for arable lands according to their ability, while those who are good in forestry, stock raising, sideline production, fishery, industry, commerce, and so on receive contracts of various trades concerned according to their ability. Contracts for production of fixed quotas in various trades are assigned to teams, to labor forces, or to households according to the principle of facilitating production and benefiting management. All operations in the process of production are to be centralized whenever centralization is suitable, and decentralized whenever decentralization is good, by the production team. Centralized distribution [of payment] is made for the portions under fixed quotas, while rewards or penalties are given for production in excess of quotas or unfulfilled production. These are stipulated in the form of contracts for the current year or for the next several years.
“This kind of system of production responsibility has many more merits than other forms of contracted production: it can satisfy the commune members’ demand for calculating payments in accordance with production, stabilize the production team’s position as the main economic entity, concretely consolidate both the mobilization of production initiative of individual commune members and the exertion of the superiority of centralized management as well as division of labor and cooperative work; it is favorable to the development of diversified business, popularization of scientific farming, and the promotion of production of commercial items; it is good for people to exert their talents, things to exert their usefulness, and land to exert its potential; it is favorable for the commune members to take care of their sideline business; and it is convenient for making arrangements for production to ensure a livelihood for the four categories of bereaved households … and the weak.labor households. This form is, on the one hand, applicable to areas currently undergoing difficulties while, on the other, it can be developed into a system of job responsibility that further divides specialties by an even higher degree and with more socialist characteristics.”
Document on How Deng Reforms Should be Administered
According to Columbia University’s Asia for Educators: “As economic reform changed the way Chinese lived and worked in the 1980s, old identities were challenged and new identities emerged. In this context, the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League were faced with new questions about what it meant to be a good Communist. In the past, one could look to an individual’s behavior and attitudes within the context of collective work and collective life. With marketization, private entrepreneurship, and the contract responsibility system, many people no longer worked within collectives. [Source: Asia for Educators, Columbia University, Primary Sources with DBQs, afe.easia.columbia.edu ]
“In the exchange below — entitled “How Should the Criteria for Admission to the Communist Youth League Be Administered After Installation of the Production Responsibility System?” (1981) — a local Communist Youth League official asks for clarification: How do you tell whether someone has the characteristics of a good Communist when their behavior can no longer be observed within the framework of collective labor? [Source: “Shixing zerenzhihou, zenyang zhangwo rutuan biaozhun?’’ Zhongguo qingnian [China Youth], No. 16 (August 26, 1981): 21. Translation from Chinese Education 18:1 (Spring 1985): 10.12. Reprinted with permission from John P. Burns and Stanley Rosen, editors, Policy Conflict in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), 1986 ] The document read: “Comrade Editor: Since the production responsibility system was installed in the countryside, we have been at a loss how to administer the criterion for recruiting new members of the Communist Youth League. To determine whether or not a youth meets the standard of a League member our previous practice was to find out whether or not he devoted himself to the interests of the public, loved the collective, and did his share for the construction of a socialist new countryside.
“Now production is contracted out to individual households. With the overall contracting system being implemented, the young people are confined to the small world of a family or a household, calculating how to increase the family income and earn a greater bonus for overfulfillment of production quotas. In this way, how can we examine and determine whether a youth has a high degree of political awareness and possesses the collectivist spirit of devoting himself to the interests of the public? Please give us an answer.”
“Yours Wang Baochang et al., Sichuan August 26, 1981 Response: Comrades Wang Baochang and Others: We must examine young people who apply for League membership strictly according to the League membership requirements set forth in the League constitution. The constitution of the Communist Youth League states in explicit terms that a League member must “implement the Party’s general and specific policies, enthusiastically fulfill the tasks assigned by League organizations, and play an exemplary role in studies, labor, and work.” Right now, different forms of the production responsibility system are being implemented across the countryside; it is precisely the major policy the Party has adopted to regulate production relations. Quite a few young people who apply for League membership are in full support of the policy. They take the initiative in contracting production projects that call for more intensive labor and higher skill in an effort to wrest continuous high yields in the land they have contracted for. This embodies precisely the exemplary role they play in carrying out conscientiously the Party’s general and specific policies. Whether a rural youth can wrest high yields, make more contributions, and provide the state and the collective with more agricultural and sideline products has now become a basic criterion for assessing his genuine love of the state, his concern for the collective, and whether or not he is doing his part for the socialist cause. To define without analysis the endeavor of doing a good job with the land one has contracted for as a move to “further one’s own interest” is incorrect.
“Implementing the different policies the Party adopts toward rural areas adds new content to the criterion a League organization should administer when recruiting new members. For example, whether or not a youth supports the line, the general and specific policies of the Party, and abides by the decrees, rules, and regulations issued by the state serves as a specific criterion for assessing his political awareness. Since implementation of the overall contracting system, for another example, investigation must be made to determine who works the hardest, who studies science and makes use of science, and who provides the state and the collective with more agricultural and sideline products. All this will serve as ironclad evidence.
“Compared with the previous practice of “everyone eating from the same big pot,” don’t things at present provide us more accuracy in administering the criterion of recruiting new League members? Obviously, the situation has changed, but the requirements for a League member set forth in the League constitution remain the same. The problem is some comrades still judge candidates by old standards when recruiting them. In their eyes, going to work like a swarm of bees and allowing “everyone to eat from the same big pot” are precisely a wholehearted devotion to the interests of the public and a love for the collective, while spending more energy on the land one has contracted for is “calculated” to further one’s own interests. In this way they feel everything is out of step with their standard and most young people, it seems, do not measure up to League member requirements. Under the new circumstances, therefore, the basic condition for one to administer correctly the criterion of admitting new League members is to catch up rapidly with the changed situation in terms of one’s way of thinking. Of course, this does not mean that we can willfully tamper with the League member requirements set forth in the League constitution and lower our demands on progressive youth. That, too, would also be incorrect.”
Decollectivization in China
Under the collectivized system, grain production kept up with population growth (China's population nearly doubled from 1950 to 1980), and the rural population was guaranteed a secure but low level of subsistence. But the collectivized system seemed to offer few possibilities for rapid economic growth. There was some discontent with a system that relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. In the late 1970s, administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. In most cases, these took the form of breaking up the collective production team, contracting with individual households to work assigned portions of collective land, and expanding the variety of crops or livestock that could be produced. The experiments were deemed successful and popular, and they soon spread to all districts. By the winter of 1982-83, the people's communes were abolished; they were replaced by administrative townships and a number of specialized teams or businesses that often leased such collective assets as tractors and provided services for money. [Source: Library of Congress *]
“The agricultural reforms of the early 1980s led to a confusingly large number of new production arrangements and contracts. Underlying the variability of administrative and contractual forms were several basic principles and trends. In the first place, land, the fundamental means of production, remained collective property. It was leased, allocated, or contracted to individual households, but the households did not own the land and could not transfer it to other households. The household became, in most cases, the basic economic unit and was responsible for its own production and losses. Most economic activity was arranged through contracts, which typically secured promises to provide a certain amount of a commodity or sum of money to the township government in return for the use of land, or workshops, or tractors. *
“The goal of the contracting system was to increase efficiency in the use of resources and to tap peasant initiative. The rigid requirement that all villages produce grain was replaced by recognition of the advantages of specialization and exchange, as well as a much greater role for markets. Some "specialized households" devoted themselves entirely to production of cash crops or provision of services and reaped large rewards. The overall picture was one of increasing specialization, differentiation, and exchange in the rural economy and in society in general. Rural incomes increased rapidly, in part because the state substantially increased the prices it paid for staple crops and in part because of economic growth stimulated by the expansion of markets and the rediscovery of comparative advantage. *
Chinese Communes After Deng Reforms
Under Deng, some communes were kept going. Members of the most productive collective in China, the Western Pass Commune near Shandong, saw their earnings per person jump from about 100 yuan in 1971 to 9,000 yuan in 1986. In 1971, the commune had one function: raising wheat. Beginning in 1979, each person was given about a 1,000 yuan a year and the rest of the money earned by the commune was reinvested into the commune. After 1979 the commune began raising many kinds of crops and later it opened a hotel, set up transportation services and established different kinds of industries. The commune even had a hospital with modern equipment. Other communes didn’t do so well. Some commune workers go months without getting paid.
Most communes and collectives were broken up or abandoned and their land was divided up among private landowners. In most cases the commune land was divided equally among families that lived on the commune, leaving some places dotted with farms that were only a fifth of an acre in size.
Farming households typically received about a half acre per person to cultivate themselves. They had to pay for seeds and fertilizer themselves and fulfil production quotas but otherwise they were free to grow what the wanted. Many grew lucrative crops they could sell for profit such as melons. In many cases productivity increased and harvests were much bigger.
China's 700 million farmers are largely considered independent. Still they raise crops on government land and many sell them to state-owned grain companies. Some collective farms were purchased entrepreneurs and turned into large farms that grow cash crops.
Improved Crop Yields After Deng Reforms
In 1949 China could only support about seven of its citizens on a hectare of land now it can support about 12 people on that amount of land. With tractors, fertilizers and improved seeds in some cases 60 farmers can raises as much food as 1,200 people 20 years ago.
Crops yields have been improved through intercropping, interplanting, winter farming, improved technology and using plastic greenhouses to raise vegetables out of season. Mainly with the help of irrigation and flood control schemes, food production in China doubled between 1952 and 1992. The use of chemical fertilizer increased four times from 1978 to 1993 but the grain output was only 50 percent higher. These improvements have been cancelled out as the amount of arable land has shrunk and the population increases.
Consequences of Rural Reform in China
Decollectivization increased the options available to individual households and made household heads increasingly responsible for the economic success of their households. In 1987, for example, it was legally possible to leave the village and move into a nearby town to work in a small factory, open a noodle stand, or set up a machine repair business. Farmers, however, still could not legally move into medium-sized or large cities. The Chinese press reported an increased appreciation in the countryside for education and an increased desire for agriculturally oriented newspapers and journals, as well as clearly written manuals on such profitable trades as rabbit-raising and beekeeping. As specialization and division of labor increased, along with increasingly visible differences in income and living standards, it became more difficult to encompass most of the rural population in a few large categories. During the early 1980s, the pace of economic and social change in rural China was rapid, and the people caught up in the change had difficulty making sense of the process. [Source: Library of Congress *]
The state retained both its powers and its role in the rural economy in the 1980s. Decollectivization, like the collectivization of the 1950s, was directed from the top down. Sometimes, apparently, it was imposed on communities that had been content with their collective methods. But in permitting households and communities greater leeway to decide what to produce and in allowing the growth of rural markets and small-scale industries, the state stepped back from the close supervision and mandatory quotas of the 1960s and 1970s. *
Decollectivization obviated the supervisory functions of lowlevel cadres, who no longer needed to oversee work on the collective fields. Some cadres became full-time administrators in township offices, and others took advantage of the reforms by establishing specialized production households or by leasing collective property at favorable rates. Former cadres, with their networks of connections and familiarity with administrative procedures, were in a better position than ordinary farmers to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the growth of markets and commercial activity. Even those cadres not wholly devoted to increasing their own families' income found that to serve their fellow villagers as expected it was necessary to act as entrepreneurs. Village-level cadres in the mid-1980s were functioning less as overseers and more as extension agents and marketing consultants. *
By 1987 rural society was more open and diverse than in the 1960s and 1970s, and the rigid collective units of that period, which had reflected the state's overwhelming concern for security, had been replaced by networks and clusters of smaller units. The new, looser structure demonstrated the priority placed on efficiency and economic growth. Basic security, in the sense of an adequate supply of food and guarantees of support for the disabled, orphaned, or aged, was taken for granted. Less than half of China's population remembered the insecurity and risks of pre-1950 society, but the costs and inefficiencies of the collective system were fresh in their minds. Increased specialization and division of labor were trends not likely to be reversed. In the rural areas the significance of the work unit appeared to have diminished, although people still lived in villages, and the actions of low-level administrative cadres still affected ordinary farmers or petty traders in immediate ways.*
Scientific farming poster
The state and its officials still dominated the economy, controlled supplies of essential goods, taxed and regulated businesses and markets, and awarded contracts. The stratification system of the Maoist period had been based on a hierarchy of functionally unspecialized cadres directing the labors of a fairly uniform mass of peasants. It was replaced in the 1980s by a new elite of economically specialized households and entrepreneurs who had managed to come to terms with the administrative cadres who controlled access to many of the resources necessary for economic success. Local cadres still had the power to impose fees, taxes, and all manner of exactions. The norms of the new system were not clear, and the economic and social system continued to change in response to the rapid growth of rural commerce and industry and to national economic policies and reforms. *
Increased commercial activity produced a high degree of normative ambiguity, especially in areas like central Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces, where rural economic growth was fastest. Neither the proper role of local officials nor the rights and obligations of new entrepreneurs or traders were clear. The line between the normal use of personal contacts and hospitality and extraordinary and criminal favoritism and corruption was ambiguous. There were hints of the development of a system of patron-client ties, in which administrative cadres granted favors to ordinary farmers in return for support, esteem, and an occasional gift. The increased number of corruption cases reported in the Chinese press and the widespread assumption that the decollectivization and rural economic reforms had led to growing corruption probably reflected both the increased opportunities for deals and favors of all sorts and the ambiguous nature of many of the transactions and relationships. The party's repeated calls for improved "socialist spiritual civilization" and the attempts of the central authorities both to create a system of civil law and to foster respect for it can be interpreted as responses to the problem. On the local level, where cadres and entrepreneurs were engaged in constant negotiation on the rules of their game, the problem was presumably being addressed in a more straightforward fashion. *
Image Sources: Landsberger Posters http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/; Commune in the 11950s, Ohio State University; Deng-era market, Nolls China website http://www.paulnoll.com/China/index.html, Wiki Commons; Asia Obscura
Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, National Geographic, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, Lonely Planet Guides, Compton’s Encyclopedia and various books and other publications.
Last updated August 2012