MILITARY IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan has the world's six th-largest armed forces, with 653,800 active personnel. Regarded as well trained and disciplined, it gobbles up a huge amount of national budget of Pakistan, a country badly in need of better schools and hospitals. However, according to “Countries of the World and Their Leaders”, “budget constraints and nation-building duties have reduced Pakistan's training tempo, which if not reversed, could affect the operational readiness of the armed forces. Yearbook 2009, Gale]
The Pakistani military is arguably the most powerful institution in Pakistan. A commonly used euphemism for it in Pakistan is the “establishment”. Traditionally dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns (Pathans), it had to be be strong from the start in a nation created in such a state of chaos. Within the military are secular factions and conservative Islamic ones. One Pakistan political analyst told the New York Times, “It’s the most powerful political force. It has really overwhelmed the state and society.” Criticizing the military has been equated with treason.
Members of the military act on three basic principles: 1) India is determined to destroy Pakistan and it is the duty of the military to prevent this from happening; 2) civilian politicians are corrupt, inept and unreliable and the military must step in from time to time to uphold the interests of the Pakistani people; and 3) Islam is at the heart of the military’s identity. The government of Pakistan goes to considerable lengths to protect dissemination of information about its armed forces, making research on the military difficult.
Military and security forces: Pakistan Army (includes National Guard), Pakistan Navy (includes marines, Maritime Security Agency), Pakistan Air Force (Pakistan Fizaia); Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces: Frontier Corps, Pakistan Rangers (2019). The National Guard includes the Mujahid Force, the Janbaz Force, and the National Cadet Corps. [Source: CIA World Factbook, 2020 =]
Military budget: US$10.3 billion; Military expenditures: Military expenditures: 4 percent of GDP (2019), compared with other countries in the world: 11
4. 1 percent of GDP (2018)
3.8 percent of GDP (2017)
3.6 percent of GDP (2016)
3.6 percent of GDP (2015)
[Source: Wikipedia =]
Military and security service personnel strengths: estimates of the size of the Pakistan military’s active force vary; approximately 650,000 active personnel (560,000 Army; 30,000 Navy; 60,000 Air Force); est.70,000 Frontier Corps; est. 25,000 Pakistan Rangers. =
The Pakistan military inventory includes a broad mix of equipment, primarily from China, France, Ukraine, the UK, and the US; since 2010, China and the US are the leading suppliers of arms to Pakistan; Pakistan also has a large domestic defense industry capable of upgrading existing air, land, and sea weapons systems (2019 est.). =
Military deployments: 1,240 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 2,030 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); 130 Mali (MINUSMA); 900 Sudan (UNAMID) (April 2020) =
Armed forces personnel (percentage of total labor force): 1.3 percent (compared to 9 percent in North Korea and 0.8 percent in the United States). [Source: World Bank worldbank.org ]
Number of people in the military: 653,800 (compared 74,200 in Argentina, 1,358,193 in the United States, 0 in Costa Rica, and 2,035,000 in China). In Pakistan, an additional 282,000 people are in paramilitary units, bringing the total to 935,800. [Source: 2019 edition of "The Military Balance" published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Wikipedia Wikipedia ]
Pakistan’s military budget is around $10.3 billion. It has 2,433 tanks, eight frigates, eight non-nuclear submarines, 413 military aircraft, 194 attack helicopters and 160 nuclear weapons. [Source: Wikipedia, 2020]
Armed Forces of Pakistan
The military is formally called the Pakistan Armed Forces. Under the 1973 constitution, the federal government controls the armed forces, and the president is the commander in chief. The Ministry of Defence has a permanent staff of civil servants headed by the defense secretary general, and the minister of defense is a civilian member of the prime minister’s cabinet. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with problems concerning military aspects of state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the army, navy, and air force. [Source: Library of Congress, February 2005 **]
The committee’s secretariat acts as the principal link between the service headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is of particular importance at the joint services level because it manages covert operations outside of Pakistan (and in internationally disputed areas) and because it has been involved in domestic politics, usually to keep track of the incumbent regime’s opponents. The chief of the army staff (COAS) is the key power holder in the armed forces and is also one of the triumvirate that runs the country, along with the prime minister and president. The COAS usually operates from army headquarters in Rawalpindi. General Pervez Musharraf acts as both president and COAS. Musharraf also heads a National Security Council composed of politicians and senior military officers. **
Because the military conducts its affairs with carefully defended secrecy, the degree to which army officers and personnel are religiously motivated is debated. However, Western analysts tend to conclude that whereas the military increasingly sees itself as serving Islam, the institution’s decision making is still largely secular. Military intervention in politics is designed to limit civilian involvement in sensitive matters, such as Kashmir, nuclear disarmament, internal military personnel decisions, and defense spending. The military also is extensively involved in the economy, and military enterprises produce approximately 3 percent of the gross national product. Military enterprises include the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), whose assets include the Askari Bank, one of the country’s largest financial institutions, and the Fauji Foundation, which is the country’s biggest conglomerate. These and other military financial institutions often are exempt from taxes and regulations covering the manufacturing sector and asset disclosure.
With regard to military strategy, the military’s budget and personnel have reduced strategy to largely defensive objectives, such as limited offensive tactics in bordering areas (particularly Kashmir), use of irregular forces, and deterring and countering possible attacks from foreign powers (particularly India). The military’s history of far lower military expenditures and capabilities than India has prompted the military to attempt to impose high costs on India to force its withdrawal from Kashmir. Furthermore, the military hopes that its nuclear capabilities can reduce the disadvantages of its conventional forces. However, the theoretical deterrence between nuclear powers has not limited military engagement between India and Pakistan — as exemplified by the 1999 Kargil War — and analysts believe that Pakistan’s military strategy historically has suffered from overly optimistic assessments of potential success and underestimations of diplomatic and military losses, as well as a lack of contingency planning.
Role of the Military in Pakistan
In many ways the military hold the highest status in Pakistan. Member of the military enjoy high status, a pampered life and many perks. Military hospitals and schools are regarded as among the best in the country.
The armed forces of Pakistan have traditionally played a distinctive role in the life of the nation. As in many other developing countries, they are an important modernizing force in society and a key tool of national integration. As defenders of the nation's interests in Pakistan's troubled and volatile geopolitical neighborhood, the armed forces are accorded a particularly high status in public opinion. Less welcome, however, has been the repeated interference of the armed forces in the internal affairs and politics of the country. The military has frequently been called in to gain control of unrest that has gone beyond the ability of the police to cope; some of these intrusions have had a major impact and have been of fairly long duration. The military has assumed political as well as security control of the entire country three times under proclamations of martial law. Indeed, since it became an independent state in 1947, Pakistan has been under military control for much of its existence. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
At the same time, however, democracy has always been seen as the "natural" state of the Pakistani polity, and the military has ultimately returned power to civilian hands. Thus, although the armed forces dominated the country to a certain extent, they have not perpetuated a military dictatorship. The military has been a permanent factor in the life of the country, but in a role that has ranged from complete control to vigilant observer. As political scientist Leonard Binder has observed, "Even [Pakistan's] dependence upon the military does not necessarily make of it a praetorian state, because there is little evidence that the state works in the sole interest of the military. Rather, it was the military which intervened in order to prevent the breakdown of the patrimonial system." Much of the political history of Pakistan has been set in this drama of contending influences, and the military in early 1994 was still searching for a role that would reconcile its interests and the broader needs of a country whose politicians were struggling to establish a credible authority of their own.*
As Pakistan approached the end of its first half-century of existence, its security problems had changed yet were in many ways the same. The global setting had altered radically, but the enmity with India remained a constant, although it had gained in predictability and, probably, stability. Subversion was still a potential rather than an active threat. Problems of law and order were more acute, but the means of dealing with them had not changed greatly. Rather, Pakistan's security problems were rooted in its own polity and society. Repeated political collapse, corruption, inability to define its ethnic and religious identities, and failure to meet the needs of the people — these are challenges that could eviscerate a state even with the most capable military machine and efficient security apparatus. Pakistan, as it considers its continuing security dilemma and the international image it wishes to project, must energetically confront and deal with these harsh realities.*
Constitutional Basis and Missions of the Pakistan Military
Article 243 of the 1973 constitution states that the federal government controls the armed forces and gives the president power to raise and maintain active and reserve forces, grant commissions, and appoint the chiefs of staff of the three services (see President). Under Article 242, the president is commander in chief of the armed forces. The original intent was that the president act according to the guidance of the prime minister. However, the Eighth Amendment to the nominally "revived" but fundamentally altered 1973 constitution, promulgated in 1985 by President Zia, specifies in Article 90 that national executive power is vested in the president. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
Article 245 prescribes the functions of the armed forces as defense of the nation against external aggression or threat of war and, subject to law, aid-to-the-civil power when called upon. This article is intended to keep the military from acting independently of the elected political leadership in domestic affairs. It was notably unsuccessful in protecting Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from Zia's demand for "accountability," culminating in Bhutto's trial, conviction, and eventual execution on a charge of conspiring to murder one of his political opponents. Article 244 prescribes the oath taken by the armed forces, including the pledge "not to engage myself in any political activities whatsoever." This requirement is not, however, meant to restrict members of the armed forces from voting.*
Article 39 enjoins the state to enable people from all parts of Pakistan to join the armed forces. It does not, however, require proportional representation of provinces, and only modest progress has been made in making the military more geographically representative.*
In addition to the constitutionally prescribed missions of defending the country (including protecting the borders and coastline) and continuing the traditional aid-to-the-civil power, the army has an unstated, self-appointed mission of guarding the domestic order — "guardian of the family silver," as Pakistani journalist Mushahid Hussain puts it. It is this concept of its mission that has led the military to assume power on three separate occasions.*
The military engages in a broad range of public service and economic activities and plays a leading role in dealing with natural disasters. The army services do not, however, have a record of participating in foreign disaster relief. The army engaged in civic action work in strategically sensitive areas, especially Balochistan, but did not see itself as having a generalized role in civic action and economic development matters that were not directly of its concern. General Waheed even resisted an army role in antinarcotics work, probably fearing its temptation as well as its distraction from the army's primary role as the defender of the country.*
Defense Strategy of the Pakistani Military
Members of the military act on three basic principles: 1) India is determined to destroy Pakistan and it is the duty of the military to prevent this from happening; 2) civilian politicians are corrupt, inept and unreliable and the military must step in from time to time to uphold the interests of the Pakistani people; and 3) Islam is at the heart of the military’s identity.
Pakistan remains, despite its substantial military force, a nation with a gaping security deficit. India disposes of forces sometimes almost three times as large as Pakistan's, and this disparity is only partially offset by India's need to defend its border with China. Senior Pakistani officers are well aware of the fact that their forces are not equal to India's, and few would willingly provoke a test of strength. Further, although Pakistan had built up its fuel and ammunition reserves to fortyfive days' supplies by 1992, past experience has taught the nation not to count on replenishment. War avoidance has been the primary goal of Pakistani security policy, especially since the Zia years. At the same time, the military accepts the fact that war is possible and is determined to acquit itself well. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
Pakistan, like virtually every other nation, proclaims that its forces and strategy are defensive. Faced with a much superior enemy, uncertain sources of supply, and little strategic depth, Pakistan cannot expect to absorb an initial attack and to successfully fight a protracted defensive war. Thus, in terms of conventional strategy, Pakistan has emphasized a doctrine of "offensive defense," which provides for quick preemptive strikes once a war begins in order to disrupt an enemy advance and inflict high costs. In addition, such actions are designed to gain salients in enemy territory, which can be used as trade-offs in peace negotiations. Navy and air force roles would be mainly defensive. The large-scale exercise Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of the Faithful), which took place in 1989, was held far enough away from the border not to frighten India, and, indeed, foreign observers were invited. Its scenario and the publicity that attended it were, however, meant to illustrate the offensivedefense doctrine and to make sure that India understood it.*
Ministry of Defence in Pakistan
The minister of defense is a civilian member of the cabinet, chairs the Defence Council, and is in turn a member of the higher-level Cabinet Defence Committee. The Ministry of Defence has a permanent staff of civil servants headed by the defense secretary general. Of particular importance to the Ministry of Defence is the adviser for military finance, who heads the Military Finance Division in the Ministry of Finance but is attached to the Ministry of Defence. The adviser functions as the principal financial officer of the defense ministry and the subordinate services. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems bearing on the military aspects of state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the three services. In peacetime, its principal function is planning; in time of war, its chairman is the principal staff officer to the president in the supervision and conduct of the war. The secretariat of the committee serves as the principal link between the service headquarters and the Ministry of Defence in addition to coordinating matters between the services. The three branches within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deal with planning, training, and logistics. Affiliated with the committee are the offices of the engineer in chief, the director general of medical service, the director of inter-services intelligence, and the director of inter-services public relations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee supervises the National Defence College, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Inter-Service Selection Board.)
The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's importance derives from two sources. First, it is the agency charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan — whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. Second, in the past it was deeply involved in domestic politics and kept track of the incumbent regime's opponents. In addition, when the regime was unpopular with the military and the president (as was Benazir Bhutto's first government), the agency helped topple it by working with opposition political parties.*
Military and Politics in Pakistan
The military is regarded by some as Pakistan's strongest and most cohesive institution. Pakistan was directly controlled by the military for half of its existence and the other half the military played a major role behind the scenes. Suketa Mehta, a New York-based writer from Bombay, wrote in Time: "The difference between India and Pakistan is army rule. Their youngsters hate India. Army rule has dinned it into their heads to make war. Our democracy, whatever it is, has worked."
The Pakistan military sometimes acts as if it views one of its primary responsibilities as being to step in and make things right when elected officials let the country down through corruption, political chaos and destructive economic policies. Many want the military to undergo democratic reforms and be given a constitutional role along the lines of that of the military in Turkey, where the state has precedence over democracy.
Under the constitution, the military is responsible for defending the nation against external aggression and threats of war and is to aid civil authorities only when called to do so. The military is forbidden constitutionally from acting independently of the elected political leadership in domestic matters. However, from 1947 to 2004 military generals have acted as head of state for nearly 30 years, and in times of civilian government the armed forces have routinely intervened on domestic and foreign policy issues. The military justifies its consistent involvement in politics as protection from malign foreign interests and corrupt and incompetent politicians. Although public opinion surveys are rare, it appears that the public dislikes military rule, yet consistently has a more favorable view of the military than of elected officials. [Source: Library of Congress, February 2005]
Military activity in Pakistan has included four military coups: in 1955, 1969, 1977 and 1999. Several years after each one civilian control of the government was returned via popular election. After the October 1999 coup, Pervez Musharraf claimed power as a general and then became president in a semi-rigged election.
Beginning in the 1990s, the military began distancing itself from politics. Then returned in a big way under Pervez Musharraf, who led Pakistan from 1999 to 2008. Under Musharraf the military could veto almost any decision made by politicians and military figures were appointed to top posts in the government and business. He was forced to resign in 2008 under pressure from street protests and the Pakistani judiciary. He is given some credit for improving local governments and fighting extremism.
Military and Islam in Pakistan
Unlike Turkey where the military plays a strong role guaranteeing a secular state as opposed to an Islamic one, the Pakistani military is sympathetic to the Islamic cause. Some of this dates back to the colonial Raj era when the British encouraged worship as a form of discipline. The movement was given a boost by the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban has its roots in the involvement and creation of Islamist military group the Pakistani military spy service to engage in militant activity in Kashmir.
The motto of the Pakistan military since the 1970s has been “Faith, Piety and Jihad in the Way of Allah.” At the Pakistan Military Academy there is a “Martyr’s gallery” and signs that read things like “Victory Awaits Those Who Have faith in God.” The curriculum includes s a six-month course in Islamic studies. Some members of the military say one should not read too much into this: that the signs and slogans are just motivational tools.
One high-ranking officer told the Los Angeles Times, “Islam is the most dynamic force today because, unlike other religions, it hasn’t succumbed to secularism. It doesn’t divide human life between the religious and the secular, the spiritual and the profane, Only Islam offers an integrated approach to the totality of human existence. Only Islam is the route to victory.” A cadet at the Pakistan Military Academy told the Washington Post, “Our basic route is Islam. When we have to command, when we have to make decisions, for that we have a role model: The Prophet, Peace be Upon Him.
Zia and Islam in the Pakistani Military
Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, who was rhe leader of Pakistan from 1977 to 1988, promoted conservative officers to generals, assigned Muslim cleric to combat units, introduced Islamic teaching to the military academy, expanded the powers of the intelligence services and forged close ties with conservative Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, which gave Pakistan money to build large mosques and Islamic schools. Zia was not overly religious himself. He used conservative Islam as a way of unifying the country, restoring some dignity lost in the debacle with Bangladesh in 1971 and giving a religious mandate to the military and his role as its leader. He stop short of introducing Islam to political and economic policy and was a secularist in those matters.
Mohsin Hamid wrote in Smithsonian, under Zia “hard-eyed men with beards became commonplace in our cities as a more intolerant and narrow brand of Islam took hold among civil authorities, my fellow teenagers and I would be arrested just for going out on dates. radio and television began broadcasting news in Arabic, a language spoken by few Pakistanis. And my father, the a professor of economics at Punjab University, came home with stories about colleagues resigning after being held up at gunpoint for expressing views that were “un-Islamic.”
Islamist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Siahaba were heavily supported by Zia who used them to harass civilian politicians and continued to have strong ties with the Pakistan intelligence services particularly through retired agents and army officers who worked in Afghanistan and at home.
According to “Worldmark Encyclopedia of Religious Practices”: General Zia “facilitated the Islamization of the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), an organization that controlled Pakistan's foreign policy and supported Islamic insurgency in the Indian state of Kashmir, with the goal of incorporating Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, into Pakistan. Overall, Zia ul-Haq's Islamization policies not only had wide social impact in Pakistan but also attracted considerable foreign funding and led to the establishment of a militant Islamic infrastructure that was still in operation at the start of the twenty-first century. [Source:“Worldmark Encyclopedia of Religious Practices,” Thomson Gale, 2006]
Pakistani Military, Islamist Politics and Muslim Extremism
Because Islamic parties in Pakistan have traditionally done so poorly in elections they have looked to the military to gain power. For its part, the military has found the parties useful as way of influencing and harassing opponents.
Many people in the Pakistani military have been sympathetic to Taliban. In 1995 a general named Zaheer Abbasi plotted a coup and hoped to make Pakistan an Islamic republic with himself as the supreme leader. He was arrested and thrown in jail. Afterwards officers were “thoroughly screened” for signs of excessive zealotry. The length of a man’s beard is sometimes used as a barometer of a man’s degree of Islamic zeal.
Under Musharraf, most of the top offices were pro-Western but many rank and file soldiers sympathized with Muslim extremists and harbored anti-American sentiments. One Pakistani intelligence office told the Los Angeles Times. “Most jihadis are natural allies of the army. They are pursuing he same, objectives.”
In the old days many officers received training in Britain and the United States but that changed when sanctions were placed on Pakistan in the 1990s for its nuclear weapons program. These days many have received some education in the same madrassah that produced the Taliban. For a long time have a beard and praying five times a day was means of gaining promotion. In the Musharraf era in the 2000s overly religious fervor was discouraged, with those who overtly showed it steered into dead end positions.
Officers have been arrested for having ties with Al-Qaida. An army major was court marshaled for providing shelter for top Al-Qaida member Khalid Sheik Mohammed. Other officers were arrested for failing to say anything about the scheme even though they knew about it. Al-Qaida is believed to have penetrated the Pakistani military. This is especially worrisome when you consider Pakistan has nuclear weapons.
History of the Role of Islam in the Pakistani Military
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced certain Islamic practices, notably prohibition of alcoholic beverages, into the army, and Zia encouraged still more, including the assignment of mullahs ( as chaplains, some of whom reportedly go into combat with the troops. Modest mosques have been built in military training areas, Islamic texts are being introduced into training courses, mid-grade officers must take courses and examinations on Islam, and there are serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the "Western" doctrines that the Pakistanis have been following. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
In the early 1990s, Islamic military doctrine had not replaced more traditional military doctrines, and it probably never will. Military affairs specialist Stephen P. Cohen has, however, highlighted several interesting points that have emerged. For instance, Islam has traditionally been identified with the concept of jihad, a righteous religious "striving" against unbelievers, and Islamic governments have been assiduous in describing whatever wars they fight — even against other Muslims — as jihad. Recent thinking, however, has emphasized that jihad is not a perpetual invitation to wage war against nonbelievers and, indeed, that it need not necessarily entail violence. More specifically, Pakistani writers have rejected as un-Islamic the idea of total war that emerged in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They emphasize the Quranic injunctions to conciliation and persuasion and see force only as a last resort.*
Further, these Pakistani theorists see the function of force less as a capability for combat than as something that strikes terror into the hearts of enemies and thus can actually prevent war. There is an obvious parallel here to the idea that the most terrifying of all weapons, nuclear ordnance, can act as a deterrent to war. Many Western military writers have portrayed the era of United States-Soviet mutual deterrence in these terms, and some have even applied this view as a rationale for Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities. Pakistani writers find this approach a convenient justification for their nuclear programs, and, indeed, most of the "Islamic" thinking on war still looks more like retroactive rationalizations for strategies already adopted rather than guideposts to new departures. Furthermore, Pakistanis are well aware that air combat tactics or at-sea replenishment techniques are not determined by religion, and the armed forces will continue to look for secular guidance.*
At the personnel level, the generation of cosmopolitan officers who were trained in British and United States traditions and consider religion a purely personal matter is passing from the scene. The new generation of officers is less exposed to foreign influences and is, increasingly, a product of a society that has been much more influenced by "orthodox" Islam, in which the primacy of Islam is continually emphasized and accepted.*
Relatively few Pakistanis have turned to Islamic fundamentalism, and because of the demands of their profession, Pakistani officers and soldiers seem likely to keep at least one foot in the modernist camp. Senior generals are reportedly concerned about religion looming too large in military affairs, but unless there are major changes in society and politics, the armed forces may increasingly see itself as an Islamic as well as a nationalist force.*
Military and Business
The Pakistani military operates businesses and is involved in commercial activity. It owns factories, agribusiness operations, road construction firms, private schools, hotels and other enterprises. With the government taking in so little revenues from taxes and the defense budget so high, the military has to make money some how.
The army, navy and air force operate their own foundations. The Army Welfare Trust is into banking, insurance, real estate, cement. pharmaceuticals; and shoes and runs Pakistan’s largest private bank. The Shaheen Foundations is into air cargo, television broadcasting, real estate and textiles. They run some the largest companies listed in the Bombay stock exchange. The Ministry of Defenses’s Frontier Works Organization is into property development, road building and trucking.
The military also owns a great deal of agricultural land and commercial real estate. It owns some of the most fertile land in the Punjab and has been accused of using violence to cheat tenant farmers (See Agriculture).
The generals have been accused of letting the economy lurch from crisis to crisis and teeter on the edge of collapse so they can maintain the status quo. Some of the military’s companies lose money. The military is riddled by corruption but is immune from investigations. It is also accused of using it power to prevent rival businesses from competing against it.
Fauji Foundation
The Fauji Foundation is owned and operated by the military. Among its companies are Fauji Sugar Mills; Fauji Oatmeal; Fauji LPG, producer of bottle gas; Fauji Kabirwala power plant, producer of electricity; Fauji software; and Fauji cement.
The Fauji Foundation is a semiautonomous organization run for the benefit of active and, especially, retired military personnel and their families. It engages in a variety of lucrative businesses throughout Pakistan and annually produces a surplus of US$30 million for its beneficiaries. The Baharia Foundation provides a similar service to navy families, as does the Shaheen Foundation to those of the air force.
The Fauji Foundation had a turnover of US$500 million and profits of US$41 million in 2000. Launched in 1947 with a US$3.6 million endowment from the British, it was set up to provide money for the widows of families of Pakistani soldiers who died fighting in World War II. and began expanding in the 1970s. In the 2000s it provided pensions and benefits for 8.5 million retired service men and supplied jobs for tens of thousands of servicemen.
Military Budget in Pakistan
Military expenditures: Military expenditures: 4 percent of GDP (2019, compared to 5.62 percent in Israel, 3.2 percent in the United States and 0.4 percent in Ghana). Compared with other countries in the world Pakistan ranks 11th.
4. 1 percent of GDP (2018)
3.8 percent of GDP (2017)
3.6 percent of GDP (2016)
3.6 percent of GDP (2015)
[Source: CIA World Factbook, 2020]
Pakistan spends twice as much on defense as on social services, including health and education. Almost 30 percent of Pakistan’s national budget goes to the military. The government has spent a tenth on education what it has on defense. An incredible 63 percent of Pakistan's national budgets is eaten up by military spending and dept payments (mostly on arms purchases). Soldiers out number doctors 10 to one.
According to World Bank figures for 1988 to 2003, Pakistan’s military expenditures represented 25–29 percent of central government expenditures and 6–7 percent of gross national income. In fiscal year (FY) 2004, military expenditures constituted 18 percent of government expenditures. Historically, Pakistan’s governments have used defense spending to stimulate economic growth. [Source: Library of Congress, February 2005 **]
Pakistan’s military budget in 1999 was US$3.2 billion. While defense spending decreased worldwide by 14.5 percent between 1987 and 1997, it increased by 43 percent in South Asia. South Asia spent almost twice as much on the military and half as much on education and health as Sub-Sahara Africa. In the 2000s, India spent US$10 per capita on defense and US$14 per person on education. Pakistan spent US$26 per capita on defense and US$10 per person on education.
Pakistan’s hostile relationship with India is arguably the main reason for its high military spending. Faced with the problem of defense against a much larger enemy from a relatively weak resource base, the military must lay claim to a disproportionate share of the nation's resources even to maintain a minimally effective defensive capability. The military was fortunate in that successive governments — with the exception of the early Bhutto years — believed it necessary to support the armed services as much as possible. This attitude also persisted among the public at large, who accepted the danger from India as real and present. [Source: Peter Blood, Library of Congress, 1994 *]
From 1958 until 1973, the published defense budget accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of total government expenditures. After that time, the proportions were much lower, falling to 40 and even 30 percent levels and ranging between 5 and 7 percent of GNP. At the same time, however, because of an expanding economy, actual expenditures — even allowing for inflation — showed considerable increases. The defense budget for fiscal year 1993 was set at Rs94 billion, or US$3.3 billion, which represented 27 percent of government spending and almost 9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The published budget understated expenditures by excluding procurement and defense-related research and development as well as funds spent on such activities as intelligence and the nuclear program.
Why Military in Pakistan is So Powerful
Raza Habib Raja wrote in the Express Tribune: “Military in Pakistan has been an omnipotent institution and will continue to do so. However, the balance between civilian and military leadership is complex and always in a state of flux. The only constant is that military has an upper hand. However, the degree to which it asserts its authority and is able to do so would really depend on many factors. [Source: Raza Habib Raja, Express Tribune, November 25, 2016]
“In Pakistan, there is a trend to look everything through a “conspiracy of the establishment” paradigm. However, the reality is quite complex. The army does not wield power ONLY because of its monopoly over physical violence and its maneuvers, but also because the balance of power changes towards it whenever the civilian side is weakened by internal strife and real or perceived incompetency. In a developing country like Pakistan, the army is after all one of the most cohesive and well-disciplined institutions, which enables it to successfully intervene in politics Moreover, since it has become an established and powerful political player, the politicians also try to court it in order to get some political advantage. In recent times, Imran Khan, is a clear example of a politician, who has constantly been asking army to intervene.
“But what makes the army so powerful? In Pakistan’s case, the army became powerful in the early years of the country’s history and there were two major reasons for that. The first reason was that Pakistan faced existential threat from India from the time it got independence, which meant that the state had to prioritize defense over everything else. British decision to withdraw from the subcontinent was a decision made in haste, which resulted in subsequent territorial disputes and large-scale rioting. The British withdrew, one year ahead of their original plan, after the rioting had already started. Moreover, the division of territory between India and Pakistan was controversial and the British also did not amicably settle the issue of princely states, which resulted in conflict between the two countries immediately after independence.
“Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1947-1948, which merely exacerbated the fears of the Pakistani leadership. The state had to allocate huge resources towards defense and during the first three years, military commanded a whopping 70 percent of the federal budget. Besides getting enormous resources, the military was also given a lot of autonomy in their own domain. Pakistani leadership gave the military complete independence and did not try to meddle in their affairs. Military leadership also communicated to the civilian leadership that in order to defend Pakistan, it needed complete autonomy.
“The complete freedom and high priority given to the military quickly transformed it, not only in terms of capability but also created its corporate and institutional identity. Further, Ayub Khan, the military chief, was given several extensions. He was appointed in 1951 and in 1954 given another extension. On the other hand, during the same time period, the country went through seven prime ministers and several cabinets. In India on the other hand, by 1955 the military chief had been changed six times whereas political leadership remained stable.
“The second major reason was the weakness as well as incompetency of the civilian side exacerbated by low political institutionalization. Political institutionalization was low in Pakistan from the very beginning, allowing the army to become an important political player. An early part of Pakistan’s history was marked by constant changes and palace intrigues, resulting in a lot of political chaos which enabled army to intervene easily. Once the army became a powerful political stakeholder, its role and position became entrenched due to path dependency. The argument is that if civil institutions, due to legacy or incompetency, do not get anchored in the polity, then the army and civil bureaucracy, due to their better discipline and competency, end up managing the civil affairs as well. Once that happens, a path is established which the polity follows.
“In the case of Pakistan, once military became involved in politics, its role was further entrenched due to adaptive expectations of the other political actors (both domestic and foreign), positive feedback and exercise of power (backed by instruments of physical violence). Generally, path dependency trajectory can be broken if an extraordinary event occurs which completely discredits the military. In Pakistan’s history, such event was East Pakistan debacle. Never in the history of Pakistan had its army seen such humiliation. In fact, even until this date, in the collective psychology of the nation, the East Pakistan debacle remains the lowest point in its entire history.
“For 24 years before that fateful incident, among other things, prestige in the public had enabled an army to become such a strong political player. Even when Ayub Khan himself was becoming unpopular, the Pakistan Army still enjoyed a considerable amount of respect. After the debacle, the Pakistan Army was discredited thoroughly. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had the support and popularity to build upon it and relegate an army to a purely conventional role. However, due to a combination of factors, including his own style of ruling (he ruled like a despot and targeted his opponents), the army was able to regain control.
“After 1977 the army has constantly been in the driving seat, though balance at times has shifted slightly towards the civilian side. The degree to which the military would actively and regularly intervene in the governance of the country has depended on two factors. First, it would intervene, when its institutional interests are threatened. Institutional interests encompass its corporate privileges, professional autonomy and even its influence over foreign policy. In 1999, it intervened to depose Nawaz Sharif to save itself as an institution.
“Second, it would intervene when it perceives (rightly or wrongly is another matter) that civilian side is incompetent. Over the years, army has developed a tutelary role in which it sees itself as an ultimate protector and guardian of the state. This tutelary role is an outcome of years of autonomy, disregard of civilian supremacy and also its perception that civilian side is incompetent. Pakistan’s white collar urban middle class is an active supporter for this role of the army and media personnel belonging to the same class often eulogize the army and encourage it to interfere in governance. In fact, due to this, the civil military balance skews further towards the latter whenever the former is perceived as incompetent or corrupt.
Image Sources: Wikimedia Commons
Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (tourism.gov.pk), Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan (pakistan.gov.pk), The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Reuters, Associated Press, AFP, Wikipedia and various books, websites and other publications.
Last updated February 2022