SPREADING CHINA ABROAD
China is now more involved in international affairs than it has been at any other time in history. In recent years it has upgraded its diplomatic corps and brought in new blood; boosted foreign aid to levels that match the United States in some countries; increased overseas investment; and even founded is own version of the Peace Corps.
In 2005, Beijing announced it would send 20,000 teachers to most ASEAN countries to teach Mandarin by 2010. The move was part of an fort to boot economic development between China and other countries in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. Studying Chinese has become very popular in Southeast Asia in recent years.
China is employing “soft diplomacy” and “soft power” through aid, investment, retraining personnel and otherwise throwing a lot of money around. China has over 300 Confucius Institutes modeled somewhat on German Goethe Institutes in more than 90 countries, including places like Uzbekistan and Kenya; as of 2007.
China is worried about its international reputation especially with the international media unrelenting its reportage of unsafe toys, tainted food, collapsed bridges, mining disasters, choking smog, slave-like working conditions and cancer towns. The Chinese government has hired the public relations experts Edelman and Ogilvy and Washington lobbyist Patton Boggs to help improve its image.
The Chinese government is making an effort to spread their language around the globe. It is currently creating a network of cultural centers, called Confucius Institutes, that are similar to British Councils or Goethe Institutes and whose aim is to help teach the Chinese language and spread Chinese culture.
Confucius Institutes are non-profit institute, named after ancient China's influential philosopher Confucius. They were established by China in 2004 as a tool to help non-native speakers to learn Chinese. As of June 2011, there were 322 Confucius Institutes on foreign university campuses and 369 Confucius Classrooms in elementary and high schools. In December 2008, there were 249 Confucius Institutes and 56 Confucius classrooms in 78 countries. These institutes had held 6,000 classes with more than 120,000 registered learners and organized 2,000 cultural activities with 1.2 million people attending, according to China’s Education Minister Zhou Ji. [Source: People's Daily, December 10, 2008]
Elizabeth Redden wrote in Inside Higher Ed: More than 300 colleges in more than 90 countries---including about 70 institutions in the United States---host Confucius Institutes, centers of Chinese language and culture education and research funded by China’s government. The infusion of Chinese government funding into international universities has enabled significant expansions in language teaching, cultural programming, and China-related conferences and symposia, but it has also raised fears regarding academic freedom and independence of teaching and research. Critics have questioned why colleges would provide their imprimatur to institutes that have been described by Li Changchun, China’s propaganda chief, as "an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup." [Source: Elizabeth Redden, Inside Higher Ed, January 4, 2012]
The first Confucius Institute in the United States was founded in 2004 at the University of Maryland at College Park. The expansion since then has been rapid: Columbia and Stanford Universities have Confucius Institutes, as do the Universities of Chicago and Michigan. Among the public universities with Confucius Institutes are the Universities of Alaska at Anchorage, Delaware, Hawaii at Manoa, Kansas, Massachusetts at Boston, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas at Dallas, Toledo, and Utah, as well as Middle Tennessee, Portland, Kennesaw, San Francisco, and Wayne State Universities. The State University of New York at Binghamton has a Confucius Institute dedicated to promoting Chinese opera. Some of the institutes are at universities with extensive programs and academic strength in Chinese studies, while others are not.
The Confucius Institutes are run in cooperation with Chinese partner universities and overseen by Hanban, a Chinese Ministry of Education subsidiary. Typically, host universities receive a yearly appropriation from Hanban -- in the range of $100,000 to $150,000 -- and Hanban also pays the salaries and travel costs for visiting Chinese instructors who staff the institutes. Hanban creates its own teaching materials.
Views and Concerns About Confucius Institutes
Elizabeth Redden wrote in Inside Higher Ed: "If we had a U.S. government agency that was stating that it was a tool for U.S. government propaganda, my colleagues would be up in arms about having a center like that on campus," said Anne-Marie Brady, associate professor of political science at the University of Canterbury, in New Zealand. Brady, the editor of the recent volume, China’s Thought Management (Routledge, 2011), said the space for criticism and inquiry at overseas Confucius Institutes is similar to that which Chinese citizens navigate: "They’ve got a lot of space, but the same kind of space that people have in China, which is that there are always no-go zones, and the no-go zones are obvious: Tibet, Taiwan, Falun Gong. And academia does not have no-go zones." [Source: Elizabeth Redden, Inside Higher Ed, January 4, 2012]
Other scholars, however, describe the fears regarding Confucius Institutes as, in their experiences, unfounded. "We’ve not ever had the experience of anybody telling us, 'Oh, don’t talk about that,' or, 'This is a sensitive topic, avoid that,' and our position all along has been the minute that anybody does, we’re done," said Ken Hammond, a professor of history and co-director of the Confucius Institute at New Mexico State University---which has hosted speakers who have addressed such topics as the history of Tibet and the Nationalist evacuation to Taiwan in 1949. "I wouldn’t carry on a program where those constraints were placed upon me. That’s not what I do. That’s not why I got into this."
Objections to particular Confucius Institutes have emerged. For example, in 2010, 174 University of Chicago faculty members signed a letter that, among other things, objected to the establishment of a Confucius Institute in absence of Faculty Senate approval. The letter described the institute as "an academically and politically ambiguous initiative sponsored by the government of the People’s Republic of China," and asserted that, "Proceeding without due care to ensure the institute’s academic integrity, [the administration] has risked having the university’s reputation legitimate the spread of such Confucius Institutes in this country and beyond."
This past spring, the faculty union at the University of Manitoba raised objections to a proposed Confucius Institute for academic freedom reasons. "Materials and instructors for CIs are selected and controlled by a branch of the government of the People's Republic of China," said Cameron Morrill, president of the University of Manitoba Faculty Association. "It is inappropriate to allow any government, either foreign or domestic, control over a university classroom regardless of how much money they offer."
The Canadian press also recently called attention to a provision in Hanban’s hiring practices that discriminates against teaching candidates with a "record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal organizations." The bylaws of the Confucius Institutes stipulate that "they shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China."
Lionel M. Jensen, an associate professor of East Asian languages and cultures and a fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, writes critically of the Confucius Institutes in the forthcoming book, China In and Beyond the Headlines (Rowman and Littlefield, 2012): "[S]o far there have not been any events in which the academic freedom of the host university was explicitly threatened by authorities of Hanban. Most directors have gone on record in this regard to affirm the independence of their institutes. This, though, does not mean that U.S. Confucius Institute directors do not take special care in arranging programming that is uncontroversial in the eyes of their benefactor. By this I mean that their mindfulness of the funding source has affected consideration of what is appropriate programming. At its worst, this amounts to a persistent self-censorship, a practice common to the political survival experience of Chinese citizens today." In an interview Jensen said his concerns about Confucius Institutes stem from the fact that, unlike other cultural institutes charged with promoting the study of language and culture of their countries, such as the Alliance Française, British Council, and the Goethe-Institut, Confucius Institutes are distinct for being located within institutions of higher education. "That in itself is astonishing," he said.
Jensen also has concerns about the quality of culture and language education offered through the Confucius Institutes. As he writes, the diversity of China’s cultures has been reduced by Hanban to a "uniform, quaint commodity," characterized by Chinese opera and dance performances: "The term most appropriate for CI programming is 'culturetainment.' The concept gets at the abridgment of Chinese civilization in the name of digestible forms of cultural appeal that can be readily shipped overseas. To that extent, it is possible the Chinese-language education provided by CI will fall short of standard proficiency."
Confucius Institutes as Soft Power Tools
Elizabeth Redden wrote in Inside Higher Ed: Scholars have characterized the Confucius Institutes as instruments of soft power, defined by the Harvard University political scientist Joseph Nye as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies." As James F. Paradise, a newly minted political science Ph.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles who has published an article on Confucius Institutes and soft power explained, "The Chinese government has a broader agenda, which is to project a benign image of China in the international community, and a convenient way to do this is to establish these Confucius Institutes." [Source: Elizabeth Redden, Inside Higher Ed, January 4, 2012]
"It’s not a bad thing to expose students to Chinese culture, but is it leading to an intrusion into American academic affairs?" Paradise asked. "I don’t know if I would put it in such crude terms. I think the exercise of influence happens in a much subtler way. This is an example of public diplomacy, which the U.S. has used for years. During the Cold War, there were American centers around the world."
However, Brady, of the University of Canterbury, returned to the point that the Confucius Institutes are located within universities---and even subsidized by them, in the form of matching funds and overhead costs. "What they’re promoting is a positive and benign image of Chinese society and Chinese political systems, and they are promoting Chinese language," she said. "They believe that if more people learn Chinese, they’ll have more positive feelings toward China. There’s nothing wrong with that. These are all similar activities as to what the British Council [for example] does, but the difference is that they’re in universities and universities help to subsidize them, and why would we do that?"
Confucius Institutes at American Universities
As of June 2011, there were 322 Confucius Institutes on foreign university campuses and 369 Confucius Classrooms in elementary and high schools. [Source: Forbes July 3, 2011]
Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley wrote in Bloomberg, “Miami University of Ohio established a Confucius Institute in 2007. The Hanban supplied $100,000 in start-up funds, 3,000 volumes of books, audio-visual and multimedia materials, and one or two language instructors for whom it pays salaries and expenses, according to a contract obtained by Bloomberg News through a public records request. The Hanban has provided a total of $924,785 for the institute through April 2011, according to Robin Parker, the university’s general counsel. [Source: Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley, Bloomberg August 10, 2011]
Chinese undergraduate enrollment at Miami soared to 434 in August 2010 from 16 in August 2006, said David Keitges, director of international education. Non-Ohio residents pay $38,917 a year in tuition, fees, and room and board, versus $23,745 for residents, according to Miami’s website.
Confucius Classrooms in American Elementary Schools
JRB of North Carolina wrote in September 2011, “The same PRC government agency that sponsors Confucius Institutes is also putting "Confucius Classrooms" into North Carolina high schools. My wife is Taiwanese, and my daughter took Chinese in a Confucius Classroom. The first day in class the teacher asked all the students with obvious Asian heritage to say where their families were from. When my daughter said her mother was from Taiwan, the teacher said, "Taiwan is part of China." Months later, during some free minutes in class, my daughter was looking at a map, which showed Taiwan and all of the South China Sea as belonging to China (naturally, since all of the teaching materials come from China). The teacher approached, bent down, and whispered in her ear: "Taiwan is part of China."
By the way, there were locals with good qualifications who were not even given an interview for that Chinese teaching job, because Confucius Classroom teachers must come from China on J-1 visas.
American universities like Confucius Institutes and American high schools like Confucius classrooms because China partially subsidizes them and because the PRC pays for junkets wherein administrators come to China on tours, stay in five-star hotels and get generously wined and dined. Here's looking at you Mr. Herbst!
So the Confucius Institute is "just like" the Goethe Institute or the Alliance Francaise? Give me a break! The Confucius Institute isn't anything like those organizations because China is an authoritarian one-party state, whereas Germany and France are liberal democracies. And education sponsored by those different types of governments reflects those differences. What's more, the GI and AF only sponsor weekend and after-school classes, unlike Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms which are embedded in American universities and high schools.
Teaching Chinese is great, but first hire from the large pool of qualified locals (many of whom were born in China but came to study in American universities and now understand liberal, democratic values). It is frightening how the PRC government is exerting influence over American schools and universities with dollars and control over access. We should be better and stronger than that!
Most Confucius Institutes Focus on Language Teaching
Elizabeth Redden wrote in Inside Higher Ed: The majority of Confucius Institutes focus primarily on language teaching and public outreach and programming. At New Mexico State, for example, the Confucius Institute is involved with outreach to local K-12 schools. The institute serves as a hub for 15 Chinese instructors---all of whom are funded by Hanban---who are teaching at nearby elementary, middle and high schools. The institute has also hosted conferences on the China-Mexico relationship and China in Africa. "New Mexico’s a poor state," said Hammond. "There’s not a lot of spare cash sloshing around here but we?ve been able to do things academically in terms of programming and involvement with the public schools that we never would have been able to do without this." [Source: Elizabeth Redden, Inside Higher Ed, January 4, 2012]
At North Carolina State University, the Confucius Institute offers non-credit language and cooking classes for local residents, as well as a one-credit Chinese conversation course, intended to supplement the foreign language department’s offerings. The institute oversees three language teaching outposts, "Confucius Classrooms," at Central Carolina Community College, Saint Augustine’s College, and Enloe High School, in Raleigh. Additionally, the Confucius Institute organized a professional association for North Carolina Chinese teachers and has worked with the College of Education at North Carolina State to develop a licensure program for teaching Chinese.
In a way, it’s a one-stop China shop. "We?re known as a mini China center here in the region, so if corporations want somebody to talk to about doing business in China, they contact us," said Bailian Li, vice provost for international affairs and director of the Confucius Institute. "If the public school wants to have an Asia day or a Chinese culture day, they contact us, so we send a teacher or a student to do show and tell."
The language teaching and outreach model is most common, but as more prestigious universities have signed on with Hanban, research-oriented Confucius Institutes have also developed. Stanford University, which established its Confucius Institute in 2009, received a $4 million gift from Hanban -- matched by Stanford---to fund an endowed professorship in Sinology, graduate student fellowships, and collaborative programming with Peking University. Richard Saller, dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences, said that during discussions of the gift a Hanban official expressed concern that the endowed professor might discuss "politically sensitive things, such as Tibet." "This is something that comes up in other discussions with other donors of endowed chairs, and I said what I always say, which is we don’t restrict the freedom of speech of our faculty, and that was the end of the discussion. I?ve had domestic donors walk away because of that, and in this case Hanban did not walk away."
"Given my experience, I don’t see any kind of insidious or subversive tone to this," Saller said. "I think there is a genuine interest in trying to reach the best American universities." He added that when he was provost at the University of Chicago the French government established the France Chicago Center with a million dollar gift. "The consulate in Chicago was far more involved in trying to influence the nature of the programming for the purposes the French wanted to see, than Hanban has been for our program."
Confucius Institutes as Sources of Funding
Elizabeth Redden wrote in Inside Higher Ed: Confucius Institute directors counter that Hanban provides them with the funding necessary to pursue programming of significant educational value. The University of Oregon has a Confucius Institute that sponsors events and symposia about China in a transnational context. Recent events include a lecture by a professor emeritus at Harvard on Deng Xiaoping, a folk music concert featuring musicians from the Central Music Conservancy, in Beijing, a panel discussion on Chinese foodways, and a symposium on China’s role in regulating the global information economy. Hanban does not set the agenda: The institute puts out a call for proposals for projects each year, and the proposals are vetted by a board of faculty and administrators. "Especially since there’s some suspicion of China and Chinese funding we want to make sure that everything we do is desired locally," said Bryna Goodman, the director of Oregon’s Confucius Institute, a professor of history and director of Asian Studies. She said that the Confucius Institute sends an annual budget request to Hanban outlining the proposed projects; not once, she said, have Hanban officials raised any questions regarding the content of the programming proposed. [Source: Elizabeth Redden, Inside Higher Ed, January 4, 2012]
Goodman said that the funding from China provides a good counter-balance to other funding sources for China studies, including Taiwanese sources---such as the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange -- and U.S. government sources. "In terms of academic freedom, I would say the more sources you have the better, because you can go to different units to fund different things," she said. "I would like a university that had enough independent funding so that everything could be independently funded, but that’s not how universities work."
The influx of Confucius Institute dollars comes at a time when U.S. government funding. specifically National Resource Center funding for area and language studies, has been slashed by 47 percent. Paul Jacov Smith, a professor of history and East Asian studies at Haverford College, said he worries that some of the fears surrounding the Confucius Institutes mask frustrations about the U.S.’s own disinvestment in language and culture study. "While I do worry about the strings that often seem attached to CI funding, I think some of the more general concern is generated by the frustration that we in the U.S. feel as our ability to fund our own academic projects is eroded by the economic downturn," he said. "Our national power and prestige are under pressure right now, and I worry that could fuel unproductive resentments against China."
The University of Pennsylvania’s Center for East Asian Studies is one of many National Resource Centers that’s taken the hit. "We, like everybody else, are always looking for more funding and obviously when you lose funding you become more concerned about it," said Jacques deLisle, the Stephen A. Cozen professor of law and director of the center. The University of Pennsylvania previously rejected a proposed Confucius Institute that would have focused on K-12 outreach. "Personally, I think that proposal was too narrow and with the wrong kind of Chinese counterpart institution," deLisle said. Yet, deLisle said that while there are no active negotiations at this point, he is not closed to the possibility of pursuing a different sort of Confucius Institute. "I don’t think it’s fair to say that the reduction in federal funding triggered a sudden interest in the Confucius Institute or has transformed the likelihood that we will pursue one. But like every place that has not established one, or has made a firm decision not to establish one, we?re looking around."
"One wants to have all the information one can about what kinds of options there are and what strings are attached to them," deLisle said. David Prager Branner, a Chinese lexicographer and adjunct associate professor at Columbia University, said it is a fallacy to believe that "taking money from the Chinese government will have no long-term consequences." "Of course, many of our universities are strapped for funds and the whole economics of American higher education is in the midst of changing drastically, so it’s easy to look favorably on what seems to be a little easy money. At the same time, many universities have friendly relationships with institutions in China, so it’s understandable that their administrators hope to do things to please the Chinese government."
"But I think this is like taking out a sub-prime mortgage or buying everything on credit without paying off the full debt: it may seem like a good deal at first but it will surely have consequences we may not be able to foresee at the outset. In order to try to anticipate those consequences we need to ask: why would China be willing to spend so much money to set these organizations up? Specifically why does China consider this to be in its national interest and why would it be in America’s national interest?" Branner asked.
"I'm most concerned about what might happen in the long run," said Matthew Sommer, an associate professor of Chinese history at Stanford. "The program seems to be expanding exponentially in the United States and around the world, and inevitably it’s going to have an increasing influence on the way Chinese studies is taught in the U.S. and elsewhere. It’s not so much what might happen right now, but what might happen 15 years from now, or 20 years from now."
U.S. College Professors Blacklisted in China
Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley wrote in Bloomberg, “Some of America’s most prominent China scholars who explore hot-button issues are banned in Beijing. Perry Link, a professor emeritus at Princeton University Riverside, hasn’t been able to enter China since 1995, he said. Link smuggled a dissident astrophysicist into the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising and helped edit the “Tiananmen Papers,” a 2002 collection of leaked internal documents. [Source: Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley, Bloomberg August 10, 2011] Link’s co-editor on the “Tiananmen Papers,” Columbia University Professor Andrew Nathan, said he is also blacklisted. Robert Barnett, who directs Columbia’s Modern Tibetan Studies Program, ignored two warnings from Chinese officials that he should “lean more in China’s direction,” he said. He then encountered roadblocks from Chinese authorities dealing with Tibet when he applied for visas in 2008 and 2009, he said. He didn’t feel a need in his case to ask Columbia administrators for help and hasn’t sought a visa since, he said. U.S. universities should fight for professors blacklisted by China, said Columbia President Lee Bollinger. He’s discussed Nathan’s situation with Chinese officials, who promised to “think about it,” he said.
U.S. College Professors Blacklisted in China for Views on Xinjiang
Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley wrote in Bloomberg, “They call themselves the “Xinjiang 13.” They have been denied permission to enter China, prohibited from flying on a Chinese airline and pressured to adopt China- friendly views. To return to China, two wrote statements disavowing support for the independence movement in Xinjiang province. They aren’t exiled Chinese dissidents. They are American scholars from universities, such as Georgetown and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who have suffered a backlash from China unprecedented in academia since diplomatic relations resumed in 1979. Their offense was co-writing “Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland,” a 484-page paperback published in 2004. [Source: Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley, Bloomberg August 10, 2011]
“I wound up doing the stupidest thing, bringing all of the experts in the field into one room and having the Chinese take us all out,” Justin Rudelson, former senior lecturer at Dartmouth College, who helped enlist contributors to the book and co-wrote one chapter, told Bloomberg. The sanctions, which the scholars say were imposed by China’s security services, have hampered careers, personal relationships and American understanding of Xinjiang.
Colleges employing the Xinjiang scholars took no collective action, and most were reluctant to press Chinese authorities about individual cases. Dartmouth almost fired Rudelson because he couldn’t go to China, he and Rieser said. “As a group, most of us have been very disappointed in the colleges’ and universities’ lack of sympathy and support,” said Dru Gladney, an anthropology professor at Pomona College in Claremont, California, who described himself and his American co-authors as the “Xinjiang 13.” Colleges are “so eager to jump on the China bandwagon, they put financial interests ahead of academic freedom.”
Gladney’s invitation to speak at a conference in Tianjin, China in April was rescinded after a Communist party official vetoed his participation, he said. A professor of Chinese history at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan, Linda Benson contributed the chapter on minority education in Xinjiang. After writing a 2008 book about British women missionaries to China’s Muslim regions, she was invited to a May 2010 Christian-history conference in Gansu Province in northwest China. She was denied a visa. The chapter written by Gardner Bovingdon, an associate professor at Indiana University in Bloomington, compared Uighur and official Chinese histories of Xinjiang. When Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s board met in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, in 2006, it asked Bovingdon to speak. He couldn’t get a visa.
Disputed Book on Xinjiang
Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley wrote in Bloomberg, Xinjiang had attracted little academic attention until the New York-based Henry Luce Foundation approved a $330,000 grant to the School of Advanced International Studies, or SAIS, at Johns Hopkins in 2000, said former foundation Vice President Terry Lautz. “We expected that the project would fill a gap,” said Lautz, who described the book as “very scholarly, very thorough, very carefully written and researched.” [Source: Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley, Bloomberg August 10, 2011]
S. Frederick Starr, the volume’s editor, chairs the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at SAIS, which is based in Washington. He recruited the book’s 15 co-authors: 13 Americans, one Israeli, and one Uighur. Contributors were paid $3,000 apiece, Rudelson said. Each tackled a different aspect of Xinjiang history and society, from the province’s economy, ecology, education and public health to Islamic identity and the Chinese military presence.
“I remember people saying at the beginning, “Do you think China will ban us?” Rudelson said. Starr decided against having Chinese co-authors because he didn’t want to cause them trouble with their government. He also informed the Chinese embassy at the outset about the book, giving assurances that the tone would be objective. In response, the embassy “sent senior scholars who were obviously on a fact-finding mission,” Starr said. “We sat and had very pleasant conversations.”
Then the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences prepared a translation of the Johns Hopkins book for Chinese officials and scholars. In an introduction to the Chinese translation, Pan Zhiping, a researcher at the academy, portrayed “Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland” as a U.S. government mouthpiece. Featuring “a hodgepodge of scholars, scholars in preparation, phony scholars, and shameless fabricators of political rumor,” the book by the Xinjiang 13 “provides a theoretical basis for” America “one day taking action to dismember China and separate Xinjiang,” Pan wrote.
Sichuan Airlines, a government-owned regional airline, put six of the authors on a no-fly list in 2006, according to a document provided to Bloomberg News. In the “urgent” communication, the airline’s Beijing management office instructed sales representatives to inspect the scholars’ documents and prevent them from boarding. As the co-authors began applying to return to China, their visas were denied without explanation.
“If I had pulled together a book like this that got an entire generation of scholars on a certain topic banned from the country they research, I’d like to think I would step forward to organize a coordinated response,” said James Millward, a professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service who co-wrote two chapters on Xinjiang’s political history. Starr “just wanted nothing to do with it.” The Luce Foundation’s Lautz said he urged Starr to “at least raise the issue” with China. “That didn’t really happen,” Lautz said.
On Being Blacklisted by China, And What Can Be Learned from It
In response to the Bloomberg piece of being blackliste in China , James A. Millwar of Georgetown University, one of the blacklisted Xinjiang 13, wrote in The China Beat, “The Bloomberg piece creates some misconceptions...There are a couple of key issues involved. Of special importance to scholars of China: are you in danger of being banned for what you write? My answer below will be, “not really.” And for universities, grant agencies and other institutions involved in academic exchanges with China, the episode raises the question of what you should do in the face of official Chinese interference in curriculum, research, guest lectures or other academic matters. I will suggest that a strong and collective response, organized by institutions and not left to the affected scholars themselves, is imperative. The reason for such a response is not simply to help individual scholars get visas, but to make the point that academic exchange must be unhampered and reciprocal and to set the right tone for future academic interchange with China. [Source: James A. Millwar of Georgetown University, The China Beat August 24, 2011]
On why contributors to the Xinjiang were refused visas, Willwar wrote: “Believe it or not, it was not the content per se of the Starr volume that caused the trouble. Those who have read it, in China and outside, are surprised that it caused such a furor. This volume on Xinjiang doesn’t touch directly on the most sensitive issues of human rights or terrorism, for example. Is it different in approach and argument from writing on Xinjiang published in China? Of course. Could it have been translated into Chinese and openly distributed in China? No. But in this it is no different from anything written outside China on such “sensitive” issues as contemporary Chinese politics, Taiwan, Tibet, the environment, Falun Gong, the Cultural Revolution or CCP history. We can’t know for sure (few if any people are ever told explicitly why a visa is denied), but it seems that the contributors to this volume were refused visas more because of context than content, because of the fact of the book’s existence and the manner in which authorities learned of it, rather than what was in the book itself.
The following are among the special circumstances that led to the trouble: 1) Politicization of the project (Editor Frederick Starr, not a China specialist, contacted the Chinese embassy at the very start...seeking official Chinese collaboration. I believe this put the work on radar screens it otherwise would not have got on. A better approach would have been to work through Chinese academic contacts. Also possibly contributing to the problem was the fact that meetings associated with the book were held in Washington, D.C. and... the book was mischaracterized in Chinese as a US government-funded). 2) 9-11 and the “Global War on Terror” frame. (The book project was conceived and largely drafted before 9-11. But the US war in Afghanistan and opening of bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan raised Chinese fears of US “encirclement.” 3) Opportunism of a few Chinese scholars (a copy of the manuscript in draft form made its way to security organs in China, and was internally translated and distributed to relevant units “for rebuttal” . Starr provided the draft manuscript (without consulting the contributors) to an unnamed Chinese scholar in China. It is possible that this scholar passed the manuscript on to authorities. We have heard from several separate Chinese sources that one Chinese scholar brought the book to the attention of the security services and denounced it as “separatist.”
The Bloomberg story leaves the impression that I received a visa because of a letter I wrote the Chinese ambassador, while other affected scholars who did not write such a letter do not receive visas. This is wrong. In the fall of 2006, I wrote a two-page letter which simply explained the situation, making many of the same points I make here...I pointed out that the book posed no threat to China, and pressed the importance of untrammeled academic exchange between our two countries. Since we had been accused of being Xinjiang separatists, I also wrote that I did not advocate a separate Uyghur or any other kind of state in Xinjiang. This may have been something they wanted me to say, but since it accurately reflects my views, not to mention the public position of every country internationally and even the stated position of mainstream Uyghur advocacy groups in exile, it is hardly a self-criticism, confession, or retraction...I did indeed receive a visa in 2007 after this letter and the lobbying of the NCUSCR. But in 2008 and 2009 I was again refused visas.
Once we were blacklisted, it became bureaucratically difficult to lift the ban---and indeed, we are still on what might be called a gray-list---even after many in Chinese officialdom apparently recognized that it was a bad idea to exclude us. The Bloomberg piece accurately reflects my and other contributors’ frustration at the weak responses by our own universities.
Should Chinese studies scholars be careful about what they write? We know how the Starr book got to Chinese authorities’ attention, and this suggests that no one in China’s security services is tasked with trolling through US academic writing looking for western scholars to ban. And while some Chinese academics are closely associated with the state and do write official reports about our work, the vast majority are not interested in sticking it to US scholars...Thus my advice to my colleagues outside of China is, speaking purely practically, to go ahead and publish in English in normal academic publications without concern about visas. What you write may be too much for publishers in China, and thus cannot be translated and published there---but those editors will make that calculation. I know of no other example besides the Starr book, with its peculiar circumstances, where Chinese authorities have denied visas to western academics because of what they published in English academic venues.
Other Views on Being Blacklisted by China
Gordon G. Chang, the author of "The Coming Collapse of China” and a columnist at Forbes.com, said, “At this moment, American universities are no match for China’s Communist Party. If they operate campuses in China or even maintain exchanges with their counterpart Chinese institutions, Beijing will exert pressure on them. Academic freedom, which does not exist in China, will suffer in America.
Unfortunately, everything is considered “political” in China because the party has followed Mao Zedong’s famous instruction to put politics “in command.” Of course, China has abandoned Mao’s totalitarianism, but it has also gone beyond the more open days sponsored by his successors, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The China of Hu Jintao, the current leader, has been marked by a multiyear crackdown affecting virtually every aspect of society. Under Hu, the Communist Party has shown greater determination to control discourse about China, both inside and outside the country. So it is no surprise it has denied visas to scholars, limited their access to materials, and exacted what are essentially loyalty pledges.
Dru C. Gladney, a professor of anthropology at Pomona College, wrote, “There have been numerous scholars who have been denied entry to many countries. The reasons for these restrictions or blacklists are often highly complex and sometimes impossible to explain. The Chinese government's decision to impose and then sometimes reverse a decision will perhaps never be fully understood. As one high-ranking Chinese scholar-official said to me: “It takes a certain amount of power to put one on such a list, but much greater power to take one off it.” Clearly, this is not simply a matter of academic freedom. It speaks to much larger issues in the shifting, complex dynamic of U.S.-China relations.
None of the "Xinjiang 13" scholars have ever been given any explanation as to why our group was singled out. There are many authors of works much more critical of China -- on a range of topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, human rights, the repression of artists and activists -- who have been able to travel to China with relative impunity. The unpredictable mixture of personal relationships, political connections and shifting context that led to our visa denials may perhaps never be fully accounted for.
Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Yomiuri Shimbun, The Guardian, National Geographic, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, Lonely Planet Guides, Compton’s Encyclopedia and various books and other publications.
Last updated April 2012