MODERN CHINESE NATIONALISM | Facts and Details

CHINESE NATIONALISM

Nationalist views are very strong among ordinary Chinese. The education system instills them and the culture reinforces them. The government stirs up nationalism to prop up its legitimacy. The media exploits to sell newspapers and win viewers. Some argue that nationalism has replaced Communist ideology. The nationalist writer Wang Xiaodong told the Los Angeles Times, “The Chinese people are no longer embarrassed about being Chinese. The time when China worshiped the West is over. We have a rightful sense of superiority.”

Nationalist sentiments were stirred up the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the release of Japanese textbook that glossed over atrocities committed against Chinese in World War II, the Tibetan uprising and the Olympics torch relay (See Tibet, Olympics). Nationalist sentiments are often manifested in anti-Japanese and anti-American protests. Protest over Japanese textbooks and soccer victories and the American bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the forced landing a U.S. spy plane were quite violent China sometimes uses public nationalist sentiments as diplomatic tool, stirring up anti-American and anti-Japanese feelings and using them to purse foreign policy aims and then reversing course when they seemed to get out of hand.

The Communist Party has made economic growth and nationalism the basis for its legitimacy. It encourages nationalism in the schools with textbooks that focus on China’s past victimizations by non-Chinese, and with nationalistic articles in the state medium and on Internet forums.

The Communist Party has used nationalism as an ideology to keep China together.” When Tibetans and other groups question or attack ths nation,” Tibetan scholar Dibyesg Anand of Westminster University in London told the New York Times, Chinese see it “as an attack on their core identity. It’s not only an attack on what it means to be Chinese. Even if minorities don’t feel like part of China, they are part of China’s nationality.”

The most hot-headed nationalists tend to be young, middle-class urbanites. Many dislike foreigners and are disinterested in liberal concepts like democracy. In university they take business and engineering classes and are not interested in social science or liberal arts.

Many in the Chinese government want to tone down nationalist feelings. There are worries that if feeling get stirred up too much then the nationalism may be directed at Beijing itself as has happened in the past. Even more worrisome, perhaps, is what might happen if democracy comes to China. Some think a democratic China could be dangerous than the non-democratic one that exists now.

Official patriotic classes for children was introduced in 1994 to support one party rule but had been around in one form or another since the Communist take over of China. In school, children are taught beginning at an early age that the party rescued China in 1949 from poverty, chaos and humiliation and saved Tibet from feudalism and backwardness. History classes emphasize the humiliation that China endured ay the hands of Europeans after the Opium Wars and the Japanese before and during World War II but have little or nothing to say about the Cultural Revolution or Tiananmen Square. Sch

Zhang Xianyang, a political analyst in Beijing, told the New York Times, “Nationalism and patriotism mean love your country. The Communist Party was so clever because they linked nationalism to loving the party. They said the party was the same as the country.” Some aspects of the current wave of nationalism reminds old timers of the Cultural Revolution.

Nationalist views that are voiced on the Internet, especially those framed with a negative views towards the United States and Japan, are often stronger than those promulgated by the government and sometimes reach a pitch that the government finds alarming and feels a need to reign in.

Arousing nationalist sentiment, Chinese officials have learned, can be a double-edged sword. In 2005, officials allowed public ire against Japan, over territorial disputes and textbooks that glossed over Japanese wartime atrocities, to boil over into violent street protests. After some of the anti-Japanese slogans began morphing into demands for action by Chinese leaders, the authorities clamped down. [Source: Andrew Jacobs, New York Times, December 12, 2009]

Reasons for Chinese Nationalism

China has traditionally been very isolationist. For a long time there was a widespread view in China that its culture and society were at such high level there was little the rest of the world had to offer it. In the 19th century and much of the 20th century China portrayed itself as victim of Western, Japanese and American Imperialism. One Mao slog went: “Imperialism will never abandon its intention to destroy us.” See History

Modern Chinese nationalism has it roots in self critiques and the denouncing of Confucian culture in the early 20th century as a way of explaining why China was so weak and technologically backward compared to the West. In response to Chinese nationalists that had become too Westernized under Chiang Kai-shek, Mao tried to mold a new revolutionary Chinese identity until that was undermined by Deng Xiaponing. This has left China with a kind of Chinese nationalism that is difficult to define except in terms of threats made against it, such as from Tibet, the U.S. or Japan.

Many see modern Chinese nationalism as a desire to return to the morality and propriety of ancient China and Confucianism. This sentiment is perhaps best reflected in the success of the book “Yu Dan’s Reflections on the Analects”.

Others see it on a more personal level. Xu Guoqi, a professor of East Asian Studies at Kalamazoo College, wrote in the Washington Post, “At root, it’s because we Chinese want “face” — not just from one another, but from the whole world. Chinese, especially boys, are brought up to believe that China is exceptional. But we’re not satisfied simply with believing this ourselves; we want others to believe that we’re a great nation, too.”

See Education

See Nanking, World War II

Book: “China’s New Nationalism” by Peter Hays Gries, a China scholar at the University of Oklahoma.

China, National Humiliation and Foreigners

Suffering and humiliation at the hands of foreigners was a theme in Chinese history in the 19th century and 20th century. In the Opium Wars era, Britain subdued the Chinese population with Indian opium; made tons of money; and took over Chinese territory with humiliating unequal treaties. Later, the Russians and Japanese occupied the industrial north; European nations established "treaty ports" on the Chinese coast to exploit China's resources and labor; and, finally, Japan raped and pillaged China like medieval invaders before and during World War II. The Chinese describe their feelongs with the word “guochi”, or "the national humiliation."

China expert Orville Schell wrote, “The most critical element in the formation of China’s modern identity has been the legacy of the country’s “humiliation” at the hands of foreigners, beginning with its defeat in the Opium Wars in the 19th-century and the shameful treatment of Chinese immigrants in America. The process was exacerbated by Japan’s successful industrialization, Tokyo’s invasion and occupation of the mainland during World War II, which in many ways was more psychologically devastating than Western interventions because Japan was an Asian power that had succeeded in modernizing, where China had failed.”

“This inferiority complex has been institutionalized in the Chinese mind, “Orville wrote. “In the early 20th century China took up its victimization as a theme and, and it became a fundamental element in its evolving collective identity. A new literature arose around the idea of “bainian guochi”—“100 year of national humiliation.” After the 1919 Treaty of Versailles gave Germany’s concessions in China to Japan, the expression “wuwang guochi”—“Never forget our national humiliation”— became a common slogan.”

Unhappy China and Chinese Nationalism

“ Unhappy China “ — a hot-selling new book in China in 2009 — is a collection of essays by five authors who argue that China has been too deferential to a Western world that is hostile toward it. They argue that China needs to use its growing power and economic resources to carve out its own position of pre-eminence. “From looking at the history of human civilization, we are most qualified to lead this world; Westerners should be second,” the book says. [Source: Jason Dean, Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2009]

Jason Dean wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “The authors, a group of scholars, single out the U.S. for special scorn, and say their book's message — aimed largely at younger Chinese — has been helped by the economic crisis. “This economic problem has shown the Chinese people that America does have problems, that what we've been saying is right,” said Wang Xiaodong, in an interview Friday in Beijing with three of his co-authors: Liu Yang, Song Qiang and Huang Jisu. The fifth author is Song Xiaojun.”

“Yet much of the response has been negative, reflecting the complex place that nationalism holds in today's China. Several reviews in the Chinese media have ridiculed “ Unhappy China “ as an attempt to cash in on nationalistic sentiment. The book is a way to “fish money from the pockets of the angry youth and angry elderly,” wrote one critic in the China Youth Daily, a leading state-run newspaper. An English-language article by Xinhua, the state-run news agency, said the book had failed to hit a chord with average Chinese, and quoted blistering critiques from bloggers and academics calling its nationalism embarrassing and unconstructive.”

“The authors of “Unhappy China” reject such talk, reciting a litany of grievances against the U.S., from a monetary policy that threatens to devalue China's holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds to Washington's support for Taiwan. Many of the prescriptions in “Unhappy China” echo positions China's government espouses -- strengthening the country's reliance on domestic technology and innovation, and bolstering its military, for example.”

“The authors, however, reserve some of their greatest resentment for China's current political and economic leadership. “I've already lost all hope in China's elite,” says Wang. The authors see last year's angry protests by mainly young Chinese against foreign criticism of China's Tibet policies and its hosting of the Olympics as a “milestone” for relations with the West. “America will face a less friendly China in the future,” says Wang.”

Maoist Theory Resurrected to Justify China’s Hawkish Diplomatic Stance

Willy Lam wrote in China Brief, “Conservative--and hawkish--elements in the party and the PLA have been resurrecting a number of the Great Helmsman's dictums on foreign and military affairs to justify the country’s new-found assertiveness on the diplomatic front. Hard-line theorists have heaped high praise on the Great Helmsman's so-called "three major dictums," which he put forward in the heady months before October 1, 1949. They were, one, "setting up a separate stove;" two, "put our house in order before inviting guests;" and, three, "one-sidedly favoring [the Soviet Union]". According to Zhang Baijia, Deputy Director of the CCP Research Office of Party History, the first two principles "enabled new China to seize the strategic initiative in foreign affairs" by "banishing the influence and impact of imperialism in China." The third precept, Zhang added, "enabled China to join the international pacifist camp". [Source: Willy Lam, China Brief (Jamestown Foundation) vol. 11, no. 16 September 2, 2011]

Popular media commentator Major General Luo Yuan praised Mao for daring to confront the "American imperialists" by entering the Korean War in 1950. Mao's decision, Luo said, "has served as an inspiration for the Chinese race as well as for all the suppressed peoples in the world." For Major General Zhang Zhaozhong, who thinks that "Mao Thought is very correct," the late chairman's pugilistic policies toward the West worked much better than the "tao guang yang hui" stance of "keeping a low profile and never taking the lead.". "Tao guang yang hui" refers to the largely conciliatory policy which Deng Xiaoping laid down in the early 1990s so as to improve relations with the U.S. and Europe.

Generals with illustrious "revolutionary bloodline" who are tipped to either remain — or be inducted into — the CMC to be restructured at the 18th Party Congress include the following senior officers. Current Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang (son of the late Air Force Lieutenant General Xu Lefu), is expected to be appointed one of the CMC Vice-chairmen at the 18th Congress. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian (son of Ma Zaiyao, former provost of the Political Institute of the PLA), may be promoted Air Force Commander. Two princelings also have become candidates for the key slot of Director of the General Political Department, which controls personnel and ideological matters. They are General Logistics Department Political Commissar Liu Yuan, 60, (son of state president Liu Shaoqi) and Chengdu Military Region Political Commissar Zhang Haiyang, 62, (son of Long March generation General Zhang Zhen). Both Liu and Zhang are considered Xi’s cronies. Finally, Shenyang Military Region commander Zhang Youxia (son of Gen Zhang Zongwun, who was among the first batch of generals after the founding of the People’s Republic of China), may be promoted Director of the General Armament Department in 2012.

Several of these prominent princeling officers, including Ma Xiaotian, Liu Yuan, Zhang Haiyang and Zhang Youxia, only became full generals in the past three years. Since Xi became CMC Vice Chairman last year, he has maneuvered to elevate the political fortunes of the princeling generals. For example, General Liu Yuan was earlier this year transferred from the post of Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences to the much more strategic slot of Political Commissar of the General Logistics Department. The possibilities are high that to quickly consolidate his power base after the 18th Party Congress, Xi may unreservedly back the generals’ ambitious goals of global hard-power projection. This could intensify already ferocious competition between China and the U.S. in theaters such as the Asia-Pacific Region.

China Puts Pressure on Foreign Governments to Silence Falun Gong

Andrew Higgins wrote in the Washington Post, “Beijing often puts pressure on foreign governments and organizations to curb activities it doesn’t like, a trend that has accelerated in tandem with an increase in China’s economic and diplomatic muscle. Targets for Chinese ire have ranged from a film festival in Australia showing a movie that annoyed Beijing; the Frankfurt book fair, which invited — and then disinvited — authors Beijing objected to; and the Nobel Peace Prize committee, which in December honored jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo. [Source: Andrew Higgins, Washington Post, August 5 2011]

But it is Falun Gong — a jumble of folk Buddhism, Taoism, breathing exercises and fierce anti-communism “ that has most aggravated Beijing, particularly since an incident in 2006 when a devotee heckled President Hu Jintao on the South Lawn of the White House. The Paris-based group Reporters Without Borders recently reported that China had “successfully pressured” Vietnam to detain two Falun Gong members who ran an unauthorized shortwave radio station.

Falun Gong has been proscribed in China since 1999 and largely uprooted there through harsh repression. But it has built an extensive network of followers overseas. Its reclusive founder, Li Hongzhi, now lives in self-imposed exile in New York. Unlike exiled Chinese democracy campaigners, who have mostly faded into obscurity or become mired in infighting, Li and his supporters have formed a highly organized, disciplined and mysteriously well-funded movement.

The organization’s deep pockets help fund a media empire including New Tang Dynasty Television, a satellite broadcaster; a newspaper, the Epoch Times; and the Sound of Hope radio.

Young Chinese Nationalists

Some of China’s young nationalists are from China’s best universities and often have studied the West, “one of them told Evan Osnos in an article in The New Yorker, “China was backward throughout its modern history, so we were always seeking the reasons for why the West grew strong. We learned from the West. All of us who are educated have this dream: Grow strong by learning from the West...We’ve been studying Western history for so long, we understand it well. We are think our love for China, our support for the government and the benefits of this country, is not a spontaneous reaction. It has developed after giving the matter much thought.”

Some of the most ardent and vocal nationalist are Chinese student currently studying abroad. Chinese students at the University of Southern California challenged a visit by Tibetan monk with photo and statistics during a lecture. Security moved in when someone threw a bottle at the monk. At Cornell a director that screened a film on Tibet was told “to go die” on a web forum. This surprises many in that you would think that because Chinese students are better educated and more worldly than other Chinese they would be more open minded to other viewpoints but it turns out they are often more nationalist than older Chinese who have never left China.

See Duke Incident

Many young Chinese have embraced nationalism in a way they hadn’t before after the Tibetan riots and the ensuing anti-Chinese, pro-Tibetan ensuing protests during the Olympic torch relay and threats to boycott the Olympics over the Tibet issue.

Nationalists feel the world profits from China’s cheap labor but blocks its attempts invest abroad.

Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, National Geographic Smithsonian magazine, The Guardian Times of London, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Lonely Planet Guides, Compton’s Encyclopedia and various books and other publications.

Last updated April 2012